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Abstract 
This paper provides a full picture of how Maoist economy actually performed. We 
argue that Mao’s China neither undertook a structural change towards 
industrialisation nor generated a sustainable growth from 1949 to 1978.2 With 
fatal shortcomings of a planned economic system imported from the Soviet Union 
– the ‘principle-agent’ problem and information asymmetry for the bureaucracy, 
and disincentives for producers – China’s economy remained not only deliberately 
unbalanced but also predominantly rural until the 1980s. More importantly, the 
Maoist economy was not designed to enrich and empower the masses in society. 
Instead, all key consumer goods including food, clothing and housing were strictly 
rationed. The material life of ordinary citizens in China saw no improvement. This 
paper aims to reveal the harsh reality of the Maoist economy with solid evidence 
and theoretical explanation.  
 
 
I. Introduction: The issue  
China has a long history of premodern growth in just about all categories: empire 
building and expansion, high-yield agriculture, a wide range of inventions and 
innovations, impressive commercialisation and a high degree of proto-
industrialisation, a very strong foreign trade record and a relatively comfortable 
                                                 
1  Kent Deng, Department of Economic History, LSE (k.g.deng@lse.ac.uk); Jim H. Shen, 
Department of Economics, SOAS hs63@soas.ac.uk. 
2 1949 was the beginning of Mao’s rule of China. Mao died in 1976. However, 1978 was beginning 
when deregulation of Maoism began, first in the rural sector. 
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living standard.3 However, all these were ruthlessly challenged by the rise of 
Western capitalism marked by the opium trade and the First Opium War (1839-
40). If imperial China was noted as a country of political and socio-economic 
equilibrium,4 modern China since the Opium War has been a place of chaos and 
upheavals, some deadly. Mao’s era from 1949 to 1978 was such a period.5 
 
At the heart of continuous changes lies the issue of what new developmental path 
China needs to adopt in order to cope with the altered world order and, if possible, 
to catch up with the wealthy west. The choices available to post-Opium War China 
were of three types: first, the classical and neo-classical ‘weak state-rich 
population’ type; second, the ‘strong state-poor population’ type which was shared 
by Russia (under the Tsars and Lenin-Stalin) and Meiji Japan; third, the ‘strong 
state-rich population’ type under the modern Western welfare system (see Fig. 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Numerous works have documented this, see for example, Needham 1954-2016; Skinner 1964-6, 
1971; Fairbank 1965; Hartwell 1966; Myers 1970; Elvin 1973; Fueurwerker 1976, 1984; Chao 1986; 
Gates 1996; Deng 1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 2015; Wong, 1997; Pomeranz 2000; Hobson 2004; von 
Glahn 2016. 
4 Deng 1999b. 
5 Mao’s era included the brief interim leadership under Mao’s hand-picked successor Hua Guofeng 
(1921-2008).  
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Figure 1. Developmental choices for modern China 
 
    A. Choices of the state type and people’s welfare   
                     
 
 Weak state                     Strong state 
Poor 
people  
Post-Opium War China Russia and 
Meiji Japan 
Rich 
people  
Ideal of neo/classical 
economics 
Modern welfare states 
     
B. Actions  
                     
 
 Weak state                     Strong state 
Poor 
people  
 
1911 Revolution                                                                
Nanjing government 
1927-37 
Mao’s rule 
1949-76 (1) 
 
Rich 
people  
 
N/A 
       
Mao’s rule 
1949-76 (2) 
 
Note: Solid arrow - commonly agreed change in history (or China’s first move). Broken arrow - 
claims to be tested (also China’s second move). 
 
Since China fell in the most inferior position of ‘weak state and poor population’, 
it could only go up. Thus Post-Opium War China has the ‘advantage of 
backwardness’.6 And, the opportunist costs for China to move were extremely low 
(Panel A of Figure 1). In reality, the classical, neo-classical choice of ‘weak state 
and rich population’ was unachievable, so the feasible choices were just two. There 
is a little doubt that China’s early reforms associated with the Westernisation 
Movement (yangwu yundong) and the 1911 Nationalist Revolution pushed China 
in the direction of the ‘strong state-poor population’ type. The question here is 
whether Mao Zedong’s leadership China for the better (Panel B of Figure 1). Our 
findings suggest not. 
 
                                                 
6 Gerschenkron, 1962. 
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II. Historical background of Mao’s regime  
a. Nationalism in China 
In nature, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 was more 
of a victory of nationalism (or ‘republicanism’) than communism. The recovery of 
China’s national sovereignty (in which the communists claimed a considerable 
share in the heroic war against Japanese invasion and conquest) and the re-
unification of the country after the long lasting civil wars (in which the 
communists finally prevailed) were both categorically nationalist goals. During 
the ‘Period of Recovery of the National Economy’ (1949-52), nationalism 
dominated state re-building agendas in terms of the establishment of law and 
order, implementation of land reform, balancing of the state budget, stabilisation 
of market prices, nationalisation of key economic sectors, and so forth.  
 
On the diplomatic and national defense fronts nationalism has always been the 
keynote of the People’s Republic. Until the 1970s, China spared no effort to ally 
with the nationalist Third World. China broke away with the Soviet Camp in the 
early 1960s because of the alleged ‘socialistic imperialism’ of the latter. Military 
strength was given national priority. As a result, China was the first developing 
country to possess nuclear and space technologies. 7  Nationalist colours were 
repeatedly shown in four military confrontations along China’s boarders: the 
Korean War (1950-3), Sino-Indian War (1962), Sino-Soviet War (1969) and Sino-
Vietnamese War (1979). So, the early popularity of the communist rule was 
undoubtedly based on this nationalist thrust.  
 
It is not so surprising that not until the mid-1950, some three decades after the 
establishment of the communist movement on China’s soil, was the party-
                                                 
7 This is known as ‘two bombs and one satellite wonders’ (liangdan yixing): atom and hydrogen 
bombs and an artificial satellite. They were all for the military and had little to do with people’s 
material wellbeing.  
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promoted socio-economic communism on any noticeable scale. Even so, after the 
mid-1950, Mao’s communism always heavily entwined with nationalism.  
 
b. Choice of the Stalinist model 
The Soviet model was adopted smoothly in Mao’s China, not because it had been 
tested properly. Rather, it was because the model had not been tested before while 
other models had been proven ineffective in helping China getting out of a vicious 
circle of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment in much of the nineteenth 
century. The ‘demonstration effects’ of the Great Depression in the West in the 
1930s, the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany during World War Two, and the geo-
political split between the Western and Eastern camps after the war helped a 
great deal in reducing the opportunity cost for the Chinese new political leadership 
to commit to economic Stalinism. 
 
In addition, there was the agenda of egalitarianism which had a longer tradition 
in China than either nationalism or communism. The Soviet economic system and 
practice were therefore mistaken for China’s timeless egalitarianism.8 This is 
however beyond the scope of this essay.  
 
c. State-determinism 
Mao’s era was marked by top-down state determinism. This state-determinism 
was most obvious from the radical changes in ideology and politics. Ideologically, 
there was a well-choreographed personal cult of Mao as the savior of China against 
old ‘social evils’ and the messiah of the Third World against the Western and Soviet 
imperialism. In this context, from 1949 to 1976, in his capacity as the lifetime 
Chairman of the Communist Party, Mao Zedong was in firm control over the party, 
the military, the bureaucracy and the population in the fashion of theocracy. 
Politically, ‘republicanism’ (hence the name ‘People’s Republic’) was replace by a 
                                                 
8 This overlapping has been coined as ‘pseudo-communism’ in post-Mao China.  
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party-state (or in real terms ‘Party’s Republic of China’). The abandonment of 
China’s traditional examination system for civil servants facilitated proletarian 
dictatorship. The effectiveness of this dictatorship was demonstrated in six nation-
wide purges to eliminate any potential competing power centre against party rule: 
the Movement against Three and Five Evils (sanfan wufan, 1951-2), Anti-Rightist 
Struggle (fanyou, known also as ‘One Hundred Flowers Movement’, 1957), 
Socialist Educational Drive (shejiao, also known as ‘Four Cleansings’ siqing, 1964-
5), the Cultural Revolution (wenge, 1966-76), and the Suppressions of the ‘5 April 
Protest’ (siwu shijian, known as the ‘Tian-anmen Incident’, 1976).9 In addition, to 
eliminate different opinions and factions within the party, there was more 
frequent purges inside the ruling party and the bureaucracy. Such continuous 
campaigns strengthened the Maoist state politically, which was the precondition 
for a total control of China’s economic resources by the party-state. 
 
In this context, it becomes easy to understand the function and utility of the 
market in Mainland China was first marginalized and then eliminated, all done 
systematically. 
 
 
III. Mao’s ideal versus China’s track record 
a. Reviews on Mao’s economy 
The mainstream opinion on economic intention and performance of Maoism in 
circulation has so far been by and large compatible with the official line of the 
Chinese Communist Party: Despite mismanagement Mao’s rule generated fast 
industrial growth, 10  and laid the foundation for post-Mao miracle take-off in 
China’s economy. 11  Such a view also resonates in the West. 12  It has been a 
                                                 
9 The better known ‘Tian-anmen Incident’ took place later in 1989. 
10 Maoist mismanagement has mainly been seen in the rural sector; see Chinn 1979: Putterman 
1988; Lin 1990; Kung and Lin 2003; Dikotter 2011; Wemheuer 2014.  
11 Also, see Xue 1979; Wu and Dong 2010.  
12 E.g. Gurley 1970; Shigeru 1983; Lotta 1994; Hutton 2007. 
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political taboo to view Maoism as rent-seeking at the expense of the interests of 
the ordinary people. Here, the common problem is to mistake some trees for the 
forest; or to use some trees to beautify the forest. We challenge such a view. 
 
b. Mao’s ideal 
Mao’s communism certainly promised an enriching egalitarianism with a better 
material life for everyone: employment, education, health care, pensions and so 
forth, a new China. 13  All these depended on a new economy and its good 
performance. For this end, China ran an extensive growth programme under a 
string of five-year plans. These five-year plans appeared to be developmental, 
aiming at bridging the ‘three major gaps’ (sanda chabie) between the industrial 
working class and the peasantry, between urban life and rural life, and between 
mental labour and manual labour.  
 
This prospect of a good material life eased the pain of sweeping nationalisation of 
private and corporate industrial assets (which affected the urban elite) and brutal 
collectivisation (which affected the rural masses). Undoubtedly, the same prospect 
of a good material life generated some short-term incentives among the Chinese 
population to work hard for the new Maoist regime until circa 1960.  
 
c. General growth track record 
In reality, however, people’s material life gave way unconditionally to ambitious 
industrial growth and self-reliance, commonly known as ‘import substitution 
industrialisation’ (ISI), as a policy priority during the entire Mao’s era. A better 
material life for everyone became but a lip service. To serve Mao’s industrial 
ambition, private/corporate land and capital were forcefully collectivized and 
nationalized; China’s market-based resource allocation was replaced by state-run 
resource allocation. It has been commonly agreed that this move was at least too 
                                                 
13 But, according to the Marxian doctrine of ‘depriving the exploiter’, this process can never be of 
a Pareto optimum as the old elite are targeted and become inevitably worse off.  
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far ahead of its time, if not completely flawed. Society was not ready for the 
changes. So political cohesion was common. 
 
What followed was the notorious ‘Great Leap Forward’ (dayuejin) during the later 
1950s. Mao personally fantasized the possibility of ‘surpassing Great Britain and 
catching up with the United States’ (chaoying gammei) in a short space of time to 
forficate China’s ‘dashing into communism’ (paobu jinru gongchanzhuyi). What a 
dream. In reality, however, the ‘Great Leap Forward’ ended tragically in ‘Great 
Steps Backward’ marked by (1) a mass campaign to produce mountains of useless 
outputs from traditional back-yard furnaces, (2) mass starvation that cost at least 
30 million lives; and (3) massive de-industrialisation and de-urbanisation due to 
the collapse of the alleged great leap. 
 
As the economy and people’s morale barely recovered after 1963, Mao gamboled 
again. This time was the ten-year long Cultural Revolution, something that Mao 
was proudest of in his life. From the scale and scope of damages inflicted by the 
Cultural Revolution, the Maoist state became unmistakably illiterate in terms of 
modern economic growth and development. The economy was virtually on the 
brink of total self-destruction with the standards of living among ordinary people 
pushed back for a century.  
 
Obviously, the gap between Mao’s ideal and the general track record of the 
economy under Mao’s rule was simply nonnegotiable. However, this essay will not 
concentrate on the impact of man-made disasters during Mao’s rule. Rather, it will 
look at development in its entirety to sketch out the direction in which the economy 
went and how beneficial the growth, if at all, was for the general public during 
that era.  
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d. Growth and developmental strategy: unbalanced ISI 
1. Raison d'être of the Soviet growth doctrine  
In 1924, after Lenin died, the Soviet decision-makers were divided in two rival 
camps: those who supported ‘balanced growth’ and those who fancied ‘unbalanced 
growth’. Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938) who seemed to understand economics was 
the leader of the ‘balanced growth camp’. He emphasized, quite rightly, (1) the 
symbiotic relationship between industry and agriculture; (2) the role of 
agricultural exports in obtaining advanced technology from the West; (3) the 
importance of peasant incentives, especially market incentives, to produce more 
and better. His conclusion: Lenin’s market-oriented ‘New Economic Policy’ should 
continue. Bukharin sounded very much like President Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969) who 
proposed to ‘re-set the clock’ (yao tuigou) after the disastrous ‘Great Leap Forward’ 
and to allow agriculture to revitalize itself under the policy of ‘three economic 
freedoms and one production contract’ (sanzi yibao). Yevgeni Preobrazhensky 
(1886-1937), the figurehead of the ‘unbalanced growth camp’, argued that (1) 
heavy industry should be given the priority to grow: (2) agriculture must bear the 
main burden of capital accumulation; (3) ordinary people’s consumption needed to 
be sacrificed; and (4) NEP should be abandoned. This sounds like Mao and his left-
wing comrades under the banner of so called ‘four modernisations’ (sige 
xiandaihua).14 Stalin shrewdly seized this opportunity of the divided communist 
party for his take-over of the state power.15 He skillfully swung between the two 
groups until his personal control over the party was complete.16 This piece of 
                                                 
14 The ‘four modernisations’ referred to four areas: industry, agriculture, defense, and science and 
technology. The slogan represented the pinnacle of Mao’s unbalanced growth attempts in the early 
1970s. The deadline for the four modernisations was set for 1999. Given that there was no 
mentioning of how to improve ordinary people’s living standard, this was just another license to 
extract resources from the public à la the Soviet state.    
15 Stalin first supported Bukharin’s ‘balanced growth proposal’ to defeat Preobrazhensky and his 
ally Leon Trotsky (1879-1940). Once this was achieved, Stalin framed Bukharin and sent him to a 
firing squad. After that, Stalin switched back to the ‘unbalanced growth approach’. Stalin did not 
really care about the economy. 
16 After several years of New Economic Policy, 5-7 percent of the Soviet peasantry became wealthy 
kulaki (Nove, 1992: 103) and Soviet agriculture recovered. It proves that the New Economic Policy 
provided agricultural sector with incentives to produce more and better and to invest more and 
wider. But the honey-moon between the communists and the kulaki was soon over. In 1930-1, 1.5 
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Soviet history reveals that the unbalanced growth mode was not the only choice 
available. Rather, it was purely a political decision to serve Stalin’s personal desire. 
And, Stalin was an opportunist.  
 
To be fair, however, there is a technical reason to go for an unbalanced growth 
mode. In reality, the daily task faced by the Soviet planners was how to balance 
the inputs and outputs of some 30,000 products (Gregory and Stuart 1994: 152). 
To work out a general equilibrium for a ‘balanced growth’ across these products, 
the total number of equations needs to be solved simultaneously is nine billion. 
Even if all the nine billion equations are in place, the Soviet planners had a 
constant problem with plan fulfillment. From 1932 to 1985, there was not a single 
period in which the Soviet plan was fully realized (Nove 1992: 228; Gregory and 
Stuart 1994: 152), a ‘principle-agent’ problem that festered the Soviet economic 
system from Day One. 
 
The bottom line here is that without market mechanisms, a balanced growth 
under state planning requires perfect knowledge, both quantitative and 
qualitative, of all aspects of the economy ex ante.17 If such perfect knowledge is 
unobtainable, what the planners can hope for will have to be a ‘unbalance growth’. 
So, in reality some sort of an unbalanced growth was the best the Soviet system 
could achieve.18  
 
                                                 
million kulaki - the best farmers and most active agrarian entrepreneurs of the country - were 
deported to marginal land in Siberia under Stalin’s order (Nove 1992: 166).  
17 In the West, the absence of perfect knowledge of the market and its impact have been carefully 
addressed, typically in the forms of ‘asymmetrical problem’ (referring to different business entities) 
and the ‘principle-agent problem’ (concerning the same business entity). Such issues are politically 
unacceptable by communist ideologues who deny any private, individual interest and assert a 
common goal shared among all the citizens at all times.  
18 Lenin’s formulae are unsophisticated: (1) Output of capital goods > capital goods replacement + 
new investment; (2) Output of capital goods > consumer goods; (3) Inputs in capital goods 
production > inputs in consumer goods production. This is a license for the Soviet planners to have 
a free hand to make a mess of the economy. And they certainly did.  
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Overwhelmingly, such unbalance was in favour heavy industry and its related 
modern armament. We thus define Stalin’s unbalance military-cum-ISI as the 
‘Soviet growth doctrine’. It represents the worst possible choice for modern growth 
and plants the seed of unsustainability simply because (1) it is bound to distort 
resource allocation to make growth artificially affordable in the short run and (2) 
distorted resource allocation will in turn slow growth in the long run (see Fig 2). 
 
Figure 2. Different Combinations of Growth Strategies and Their Ranking  
 
                     
 
 Unbalanced growth (–)                     Balanced growth (+) 
ISI (–) USSR, 1917-89 
Mainland China, 1952-78                
India, 1945-85 
EOI (+)  Post-war South Korea 
 
Post-war Hong Kong 
Post-war Taiwan 
Mainland China, post-1978 
 
   
Note: ISI – import substitution industrialisation with which the market is optional; EOI – export-
oriented industrialisation with which the market is essential. In India, 1955 marked a new era 
when Professor Mahanalobis promoted economic planning by the state. By and large, India 
pursued a balanced growth with ISI thanks to its functional democracy (Tomlinson 1993). South 
Korea is known for its heavy government manipulation of prices, known as ‘to get prices wrong’ in 
favour of certain industries (Alam 1989; Wade 1990; Amsden 1992). In Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
family firms form the growth engine where state intervention was moderate.19 
 
2. China’s adoption of the Soviet doctrine 
Evidently, not only did Mao adopt the Soviet unbalanced ISI doctrine soon after 
he took over political power in China (see Table 1), 20  but also he aimed to 
outplayed Stalin’s track record in his bid for leadership against his rival Nikita 
Khrushchev (1894-1971) in the international communist movement (see Table 2). 
The period slogan was ‘more, faster, better with less inputs’ (duo kuai hao sheng). 
The danger of unsustainability and cheating loomed large. 
                                                 
19 Rabushka 1979; Chou 1985; Rowen 1998: chs 2, 3, 9 and 14. 
20 To be fair, the ‘initial push’ for industrialisation was provided by Stalin’s Soviet Union. Only 
after over 140 industrial projects were imported from the Soviet Union, did China’s 
industrialisation adopt ISI in the name of ‘self-reliance’.  
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Table 1. Unbalanced ISI under Mao: Shares in Total Capital Investment, % in 
Total, 1953-75 
 
Period Heavy 
industry (A) 
Light industry 
(B) 
A:B 
1953-7 36 7 5.1 
1958-62 54* 7 7.7 
1963-5 46 4 11.5 
1966-70 51 4 12.8 
1971-5 50 6 8.3 
Average 47 6 7.8 
Source: Based on Lan 2000: 110–11. 
Note: *Figure that was inflated with iron and steel outputs of little utility or value. 
 
Table 2. Speed of Changes, China versus the Soviet Union 
 
Time lag USSR (A) China (B) B – A 
From power take-over to 
rural collectivisation 
12 years 
(1917-29) 
5 years 
(1949-54) 
–7 
Completion of rural 
collectivisation 
9 years 
(1929-38) 
1 year 
(1955-6) 
–8 
From power take-over to the 
1st Five-year Plan 
11 years 
(1917-28) 
3 years 
(1949-52) 
–8 
From power take-over to 
industrial spurt 
15 years 
(1917-32) 
9 years 
(1949-58) 
–6 
Average   –7.3 
Source: Gregory and Stuart 1994; DNS 1998: 70-88. 
 
e. China’s economic structure and its change  
In the late Qing, China’s urban-rural ratio was 0.2 (from 17% : 83%). In the early 
1920s, it improved to 0.27 (21% : 79%) (Jiang 1994: 70). In 1958-78, however, the 
ratio declined to 0.19 (16% : 84%), worse than the Qing level (Cui 1997: 11). Thus, 
regardless of what was vigorously promoted during Mao’s era, the Chinese 
population was overwhelmingly rural. 
 
Similarly, China’s employment pattern was pre-industrial: Until the very end of 
Mao’s era, the Chinese economic structure was not very different from that of the 
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Ming-Qing period, nor was it different from that of Tsarist Russia, Meiji Japan or 
colonial India (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Economic Structure Seen from Employment Shares, % in Total 
 
 Total 
employment 
Agriculture Non-
agriculture 
China, Ming-
Qing 
100 80 20 
China, 1978 100 71 29 
Russia, 1914 100 75 25 
Japan, 1872 100 72 28 
India, 1901 100 65 35 
Sources: Li 1995; Zhang 1998; Charlesworth 1982: 20; Feuerwerker 1984: 299, 302, 312-13; Chao 
1986: ch. 3; Minami 1986: 24; Wheatcroft et al. 1986: 273; Marita 1991: 101, 132; Francks 1992: 
29; Davies et al. 1994: 112; Gregory 1994: 21, 42. 
 
The alleged fast industrialisation under Mao’s rule has to be hugely exaggerated 
not only in light of the national employment pattern but also in terms of a growth 
in industrial workers slower than that of China’s population (Table 4). Instead of 
keeping up with population growth, the economy was in a process of ‘de-
industrialisation’ with a growth deficit of –0.27 per annum in relation to China’s 
population. 
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Table 4. Ultra-slow Growth in Industrial Workforce, in 106, 1959-74  
 
Year Total population 
(A) 
Industrial 
workers (B) 
B/A (%) 
1959 672.1 45.5 6.8 
1964 705.0 36.4 5.2 
1969 806.7 40.9 5.1 
1974 908.6 59.1 6.5 
Annual 
% 
2.03 1.76  
Annual 
deficit (B-A) 
 –0.27  
Sources: Data for the industrial workforce is based National Bureau of Statistics, Zhongguo 
Laodong Tongji Nianjian, 1998 (China’s Labour Statistic Year Book, 1998) (Beijing: China’s 
Statistics Press, 1998): 81. Data for China’s population are based on National Bureau of Statistics, 
China’s Statistic Year Book, 1986: 91. 
 
It is worth noting that China’s low urbanisation rate was strictly and deliberately 
guarded by Mao’s state. Forced ruralisation of population was always on the cards. 
For example, although in the industrial spurt of 1958-60, 40 million rural 
residents were employed full time in industrial projects, all the rural industrial 
projects were soon abandoned in 1962; and another 26 million urban workers with 
their families were sent to the countryside.21 In this context, the urban population 
suffered net losses. Later, in 1966-76, a total of 20 million urban youngsters were 
resettled in the countryside.22 This ruralisation scheme affected about 100 million 
urban people, or over a third of China’s urban population. 23  Mao’s forced 
ruralisation scheme did not generate any revolutionary change in rural China and 
thus proved to be counterproductive and anti-developmental mainly because 
without technological progress, extra labour only led to diminishing returns to the 
farming sector. It was loss-loss for both the urban and rural sectors. 
 
                                                 
21 Song and Qiao 1998: 183; Li and Zhang 1999: 205. 
22 Pan 1994; Cui 1997: 11. 
23 It is worth noting that Nazi Germany set the precedent of sending youngsters to rural regions.  
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However, Table 5 suggests in terms of nominal GDP accounting that Mao’s 
economy was heavily industrialised by 1978 with some 48 percent of GDP 
produced by the secondary sector, far higher than either the developed world’s 
average or that of the developing world. All this was done by a frozen amount of 
industrial workforce. It has to mean that Mao’s industrial workers had to be the 
most productive on this planet. But so far, few have challenged China’s official 
figures.24 
 
Table 5. Economic Structure Seen from Sectoral GDP Shares, % in Total 
 
Economy Primary Secondary Tertiary 
I. China, 1978 28.4 48.6* 23.0 
Japan, 1920 25.0 20.0 65.0 
India, 1965 44.0 22.0 34.0 
II. China, 
1994 
18.8 48.5* 32.7 
Developing 
world average, 
1993 
17.0 28.0 55.0 
Developed 
countries’ 
average, 1993 
2.0 26.0 64.0 
Sources: Ray 1979: 17; Lal 1988: 126-7; Rothermund 1993: 177; Gregory 1994: 28, 30; Li 1995; 
Zhang 1998; Xinhua News Agency 1997, People’s Republic of China Year Book, 1996-97: 397; 
National Statistical Bureau 1983, China’s Statistic Year Book 1983: 24. 
Note: * Nominal value only, which should be considerably lower if the arbitrary ‘scissors pricing’ 
systematically in favour of manufacturing is taken into account. 
 
What is fishy here is that in as late as 1978 the nominal GDP share of China’s 
primary sector was on the same level as Japan seven decades before at which time 
Japan was not yet fully industrialised. When India’s industrial development in 
1964 reached a similar level of Japan in 1920 (i.e. 20-22 percent of the total GDP 
coming from industry), the country was not yet fully industrialised, either. 
Moreover, it is known that Japan traded actively in the inter-war period which 
                                                 
24 Not until the end of the 1980s did China adopt the international standard of GDP accounting. 
Official figures prior to that point were all but estimates. 
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explains its high GDP of the tertiary sector. Mao’s China traded very little with 
the outside world, certainly less than India in 1964. Now, if China in 1978 and 
India in 1965 had comparable tertiary GDP shares (i.e. 23 percent versus 34 
percent), their GDP share for the primary sector should be similar, i.e. around 40 
percent. The bottom line is that unless China had become by 1978 the most 
industrialised economy in the world, compared with either the advanced countries 
(with 26 percent of GDP for the secondary sector in 1993) or the development world 
(with 28 percent of GDP for the secondary sector in 1993), we thus have enough 
reason to suggest that there is no real possibility for China’s industrial sector to 
produce that 48 percent of its total GDP under Mao’s rule. Moreover, from the data 
in Table 3, China’s employment pattern was anything but an industrialised one, 
unless China’s industrial workers had become the most efficient in the world by 
hiring a small number of workers to roll out the highest share of industrial GDP 
in the world, something that has no evidence to support. Only a cross-group 
comparison is able to spot this abnormality of China’s official statistics. 
 
This puzzling abnormality is demystified if one takes into account the arbitrary 
‘scissors pricing’ imposed as a stealthy tax by Mao’s rule systematically to feed on 
manufacturing.25 In doing so, China’s industrial GDP was artificially inflated; 
and its agricultural GPD undervalued. In real terms, therefore, the actual GDP 
share of China’s primary sector in 1978 should be close to that of India in 1965, i.e. 
circa 40 percent of the country’s total GDP. This will in turn reduce China’s 
industrial GDP to circa 20 percent. Only then does China’s economic performance 
look normal. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25  Scissors pricing continued till the 1990s. A study suggested the price gap between non-
agricultural and agricultural products was 5:1 in the 1990s (Fan 1995: 39). To correct the distortion, 
as a rule of thumb, the nominal industrial GDP may be halved; and the nominal agricultural GDP, 
doubled. 
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IV. Economic performance  
a. General picture for the Mao’s growth 
It has been widely accepted that during the first 17 years under Mao – or two-
thirds of Mao’s era – China’s economic growth went allegedly well. It has also been 
agreed that the ‘Great Leap Forward’ (1958-60) marked the pinnacle of the first 
wave of growth acceleration under Mao. The ‘Great Leap Forward’ thus served as 
a divider between two sub-periods: 1949-60 and 1961-6.  
 
To get an accurate picture of China’s economic performance under Mao, 
methodologically it is very important to eliminate institutionalized GDP inflation. 
It is known that in 1950-78, China’s inflation indexes were 135.9 and 144.7, 
measured by measured by retail prices and urban consumer good prices, 
respectively.26 China’s annual inflation rates during Mao’s era were thus between 
1.82 percent and 2.20 percent, averaging 2.01 percent. This average inflation rate 
can be used to work out China’s real growth rates (see Appendix). Moreover, 
during the period 1952 to 1980, China’s population doubled with an annual growth 
rate of 2.6 percent.27 If one takes population growth into account, China’s net 
growth rates look mediocre.  
 
Table 6 shows nominal, real and net growth rates during two sub-periods.28 The 
‘Pre-Socialist Period’ (or ‘New Democratic Period’, 1949-55) enjoyed higher growth, 
part of which was in fact economic recovery after numerous wars in China since 
the 1910s. Growth declined considerably after 1956 during the ‘Socialist Period’ 
                                                 
26 Li 1997: 49-50. 
27 See He 1994: 7. As usual, there is a debate on China’s population growth rate. But a consensus 
has been reached that the growth rate was over two percent per annum during Mao’s era; see Jiang 
1994: 70; Cui 1997: 10-11; also ZJB 1999: 52, 109, 181, 189, 198, 216, 223, 229, 234, 243, 252, 258, 
265, 270. In 1963, the growth rate reached 3.3 percent (ZJB 1999: 189). Most realistically, a rate 
of 2.6 percent per annum allows a population to double its size in 28 years. This matched perfectly 
China’s demography in 1949-78.  
28 It is another matter of whether the intention was materialized.  
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(1956-66). 29  The ‘Great Leap Forward’ from 1959 to 1961 was a part of this 
slowdown.  
 
Table 6. China’s Post-war Annual GDP Growth (%), 1949-66 
 
Period Nominal Real Net 
1949-55 14.0 11.3 11.1 
1956-66 6.1 2.3 2.3 
1949-66 9.2 5.9 5.7 
Sources: Based on Tables i and ii in Appendix. 
Note: Net GDP is obtained by discounting China’s population growth of 2.6 percent per annum (He 
1994: 7). Figures in parentheses – GDP without discount.  
 
In comparison, growth in the Soviet Union was more vigorous than China until 
1985 (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Soviet Post-war Annual Growth (%), 1951-85 
 
Period Nominal Real Real:Nominal 
1951-85 6.4 3.7 –2.7 
1951-60 10.3 5.1 –5.2 
1961-5 6.5 4.8 –1.7 
1966-70 7.8 5.0 –2.8 
1971-5 5.7 3.1 –2.6 
1976-80 4.3 2.2 –2.1 
1981-5 3.6 1.8 –1.8 
Source: Gregory and Stuart 1994: 236. 
 
Furthermore, in per capita terms, China’s economy became stagnant after 1955 
thanks to China’s population boom (see Table 8).30 Such stagnation was highly 
compatible with a frozen economic structure (see Tables 3 and 4).  
 
 
 
                                                 
29 This slowdown was recognized by scholars (e.g. Wang 1999: 81).  
30 Table 6 shows the same caliber of China’s growth during the same period regardless of some 
nuances.  
19 
 
Table 8. Official GDP Per Capital, 1956 versus 1966 
 
Year GDP 
(current prices) 
Nominal 
index 
1956 price* 
index 
Real 
index 
1956 US$ 109 US$ 109 100 100 
1966 US$ 159 US$ 123 146 113 
Annual   3.9% 1.2% 
Source: Wang 1999: 82. 
Note: * Conversion is based on the average inflation rate of 2.01 percent per year from 1950 to 
1978 (Li 1997: 49-50). 
 
Logically, (1) if industrial growth was given government priority, and (2) if the 
whole economy was stagnant at the same time, there must have been a ‘zero-sum 
game’ amongst sectors within China’s national economy. This judgement is 
strongly supported by studies of Chinese agriculture.31 Evidently, food supply was 
a constant problem (Table 9). China’s food availability under Mao was unable to 
match its Ming-Qing past,32 or India after independence.33 
 
Table 9. Food Deficits Seen from China’s Food Imports, in 104 Tons, 1953-78 
 
Period South China North China China’s total 
1953-5 –688.5 –204.3 –892.8 
1956-60 –1950.5 472.0 –1478.5 
1961-5 –669.5 2013.5 1344.0 
1966-70 –942.0 796.5 –145.5 
1971–5 –952.5 1159.0 206.5 
1976–8 22.8 1106.4 1129.2 
Source: Rural Economy Institute (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo Nongye Biange Yu Fazhan Yanjiu (A 
Study of Agricultural Reforms and Development in Contemporary China) (Beijing: China’s 
Agriculture Press, 1998), p. 251. 
Note: Negative value means food exports due to surpluses. 
 
                                                 
31 See Ling 1997; DNS 1998; Zhang 1998. 
32 During the Ming-Qing Period, Chinese agriculture was able to produce comfortably 25 percent 
food surplus most of the time to feed China’s 20 percent population in the urban sector; see 
Feuerwerker 1984: 299, 302, 312-13.  
33 Since independence, India has never suffered from any large-scale famine; see Sen 1981; Nolan 
1993.  
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Evidently, 1956 and 1978 served as two turning points. From 1956 onwards, North 
China suffered continuous food shortages. In 1976, South China faced the same 
problem. As food is a basic human need, the lack of it says a lot about the economy-
wide performance under Mao.34 
 
b. Poor capital efficiency 
Similar to the problem in the Soviet Union, Mao’s China had deteriorating capital 
efficiency. From 1953 to 1980, China’s average return-to-investment ratio was 
0.30 and its return-to-reinvestment ratio was only 0.18, a clear case of diminishing 
returns to the capital invested.35 To combat the problem Mao’s economic operators 
resorted to wasteful over-investment, often in regions and sectors where the 
returns were declining sharply. In 1958-78, the aggregate state investment was 
500 billion yuan, of which 80 percent (400 billion) was allocated in the ‘rear’ or 
‘outback’ provinces to achieve ‘pseudo-development’.36 This ‘pseudo-development’ 
went hand in hand with resources ruthlessly wasted.37 Table 10 shows its pattern: 
the speed of fixed capital investment in the outback regions increased three times 
as fast as in the coastal region; decline in capital efficiency in the outback regions 
was twice the rate of its costal counterpart. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Deliberately we avoid quoting the large-scale starvation associated with Mao’s ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ which cost over 30 million lives from 1960 to 1962 as the main evidence of China’s food 
deficits; see Bernstein 1984; Kung and Lin 2003; Yang 2008; Dikötter 2010. The point is that even 
if the ‘1959-61 Great Famine’ is taken out of the equation, China’s agriculture still did not perform 
well by China’s own premodern standards. 
35 See He 1994: 8. China’s low capital efficiency is clearly reflected by its energy use. As recent as 
the 1990s, China’s energy input-to-output ratio was twice that of the US and 6 times that of Japan 
(Zhang 1994: 65). 
36 Cui 1997: 19. 
37 This sounds like a cliché but still holds truth: opposite to what Karl Marx predicted, it is the 
inflexibility of the centrally planned command economy that lost the developmental race with 
modern capitalism (see Harriss 1995: 22).  
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Table 10. Geographic Allocation of Capital Investment and Returns, in Billion 
Yuan 
 
Year Coastal 
investment 
(K) 
Coastal 
returns (R) 
Outback 
regions’ 
investment (K) 
Outback 
regions’ 
returns (R) 
1952 10.7 (100) 23.8 
(100) 
4.2 (100) 10.5 (100) 
1978 140.0 
(1380) 
257.5 
(1082) 
179.3 (4269) 165.6 
(1577) 
 R:K  R:K  
1952 2.2 (100)  2.5 (100)  
1978 1.8 (82)  0.9 (36)  
Annual 
efficiency 
–0.8%  –4.0%  
Source: Cui 1997: 19.  
 
The main evidence also comes from the fact that the outback region-biased 
investment failed to change regional differentiation of the economy: not only had 
the coastal-outback region income gap increased by 33 percent by 1978,38 but also 
most outback region regions remained poverty-stricken in the late 1990s.39 These 
days, such investment behaviour is called ‘pointless investment’ (mangmu touzi).  
 
Unfortunately, the legacy of ‘pointless investment’ (mangmu touzi) continued in 
the post-Mao period with severe symptoms. First, until the early 1990s when 
China’s economic reforms were in full swing, of the total of 2,200 billion yuan of 
fixed capital already invested, one third was unproductive. Second, one-third of all 
the state-owned enterprises – the beneficiaries of state capital investment – were 
on the brink of bankruptcy. 40  So, wasteful investment was the hallmark of 
economic Maoism.41 
                                                 
38 Hu et al. 1995: ch. 2, especially p. 54. 
39 Zhou and Lu 1997; Zeng and Guan 1998. 
40 Pan 1995: 51. 
41 In the state sector, the ‘asymmetrical problem’ and the ‘principle-agent problem’ loomed large. 
The former took the form of unrealistic and inaccurate planning; and the latter, discord and non-
cooperation of firm managers. Indeed, if these two problems could be solved under communism, 
capitalism would be replaced everywhere.  
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Wasteful investment was also widespread in the farming sector. In 1953, China’s 
total grain output was 177 million metric tons; in 1978, it reached 300 million 
tons.42 But this was achieved by 3-4 times increase in labour input and with the 
help of modern chemical fertilizers.43 Conceptually, the agricultural sector must 
have suffered diminishing returns so bad that the marginal product of labour was 
almost certainly negative.44  
 
Wasteful investment with low returns constitutes the first part of a low level 
equilibrium tap. We call it ‘equilibrium’ because there was no possibility for the 
Maoist economy to break it free from inside of the system. 
 
c. Imbalance between industry and agriculture  
The Soviet unbalanced ISI growth model necessitates tapping the agricultural 
sector for labour and capital accumulation needed by the industrial sector in a 
closed economy. Under Stalin’s reign, this was known as ‘super-industrialisation’ 
and ‘industrial dictatorship’. Even so, it is rational to sustain the agricultural 
sector at all times for ‘golden eggs’ in a closed economic system. However, as shown 
in Table 11, growth in agricultural output was as little as 0.6 percent a year. 
Consequently, China changed from a net grain exporter to a net food importer 
(Table 9). The misfortune of China’s agriculture was turned around only in the 
1980s after Mao’s people’s communes (renmin gongshe) were abandoned in rural 
China.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Cui 1997: 10, 11, 15. 
43 Xie 1999: 30. 
44 A conservative estimate suggests a rate of -0.2 percent per year during 1957 to 1978. (Zhao 2000: 
99).  
23 
 
Table 11. Output Growth in China, Annual %, 1952-78 versus 1978-83 
 
Sector Gross rate 
1952-78 
Net rate* 
1952-78 
Gross rate 
1978-83 
Net rate* 
1978-83 
Industry 
(A) 
11.2 8.6 7.9 5.3 
Agriculture 
(B) 
2.7 0.1 7.9 5.3 
A:B 4.1 86.0 1.0 1.0 
Source: Based on Ellman 1975: 845; Lippit 1987: 107; China’s Statistic Year Book 1985: 239; He 
1994: 7-8. 
Note: * Net value is obtained by discounting China’s population growth at 2.6 percent per year 
under Mao’s rule (He 1994: 7). 
 
d. Economic cycle and crises 
During the inter-war period (1919-40) when the worldwide economic recession hit 
the West hard, the Soviet planned economy became an alternative system to 
achieve growth and prosperity. Even so, when one examines carefully the Soviet 
performance during that period, there was a five-year growth cycle (see Table 
12).45  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Marx’s early prediction that the communist system can secure economic growth without a 
business cycle and economic crises has proven to be a fairy tale.  
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Table 12. Growth Cycle in the Soviet Union, 1927-1940 
 
Cycle Year % Increase of the previous 
year 
I 1927 6.0 
 1928 8.7 
 1929 16.6 
 1930 21.1 
 1931 16.8 
 1932 11.2 
II 1933 6.6 
 1934 15.0 
 1935 19.6 
 1936 - 
 1937 20.0 
 1938 - 
 1939 - 
 1940 10.0 
Source: Based on Bandera 1984: 21. 
 
Mao’s economy performed worse than the Soviet Union: Not only did Mao’s 
economy have a four to seven-year cycle, it also had negative growth that the 
Soviet economy never experienced (see Table 13). The intervals between crises 
became shorter and crises lasted longer.46 Clearly, Mao’s China fell into a low 
level equilibrium trap. And the Maoist economy was unable to break it free from 
inside of the system. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 To indicate this point, in all there were five such intervals between major drives: five years 
between the ‘Movement against Three and Five Evils’ (1951-2) and ‘Anti-Rightist Struggle’ (1957), 
one year between ‘Anti-Rightist Struggle’ and the ‘Great Leap Forward’ (1958-60), two years 
between the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the ‘Rectification of Communes’ (zhengshe, 1962), three 
years between the ‘Consolidation of People’s Communes’ and the ‘Socialist Education Drive’ 
(shejiao, 1964-5) and one year between the ‘Socialist Educational Drive’ and the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ (1966-76). The Cultural Revolution lasted for 10 years, longer than all the other purges 
put together (8 years) and more intensifier by affecting the unprecedented amount of the Chinese 
population in peace time. 
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Table 13. Growth Cycle in Mao’s China, % Increase of the Previous Year, 1954-
1966 
 
Cycle Year Nominal 
rate 
Real rate* Net rate¶ 
I 1950 19.0 16.5 13.9 
 1951 16.7 14.4 11.8 
 1952 18.5 15.9 13.3 
 1953 20.4 17.5 14.9 
II 1954 5.5 3.1 0.5 
 1955 5.3 2.7 0.1 
 1956 11.9 9.0 6.4 
 1957 2.9 0.1 –2.5 
 1958 23.1 19.7 17.2 
 1959 9.3 6.0 3.4 
III 1960 –0.2 –3.4 –6.0 
 1961 –18.4 –21.1 –23.7 
 1962 –7.2 –10.5 –13.1 
 1963 8.2 4.3 1.7 
 1964 16.6 11.9 9.3 
 1965 19.0 14.1 11.5 
 1966 14.3 9.3 6.7 
Source: China’s Statistic Year Book 1983: 13-14, 22-3. 
Note: * Conversion is based on China’s average inflation rate of 2.01 percent per year from 1950 
to 1978 (Li 1997: 49-50). ¶ Net value is obtained by discounting China’s population growth at 2.6 
percent per year under Mao’s rule (He 1994: 7).  
 
It is worth noting that the economy-wide crisis during 1959/60 to 1962 was so 
severe that by 1962 capital investment declined by 89 percent; iron and steel 
output, 68 percent; number of state-owned firms, 46 percent; returns to capital 
investment, 30 percent; and labour productivity, 40 percent.47 If these were not 
enough, 26 million urban residents were mobilized and resettled in rural regions.48 
Mao’s economic suicide occurred between 1966 and 1976 during the Cultural 
Revolution whose damage was many times greater than the previous crises put 
together, including that of the Great Leap Forward.49  
                                                 
47 Lu 1999: 44; Li and Zhang 1999: 188, 201. 
48 Song and Qiao 1998: 183; Li and Zhang 1999: 205. 
49  The Cultural Revolution created ample opportunities for large number of ‘working class’ 
members (factory workers, commune farmers and army soldiers) to leave productive forces and 
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Earlier, from 1955 to 1957, China’s agricultural production and rural income 
significantly declined in the wake of forced rural collectivisation (see Table 14), an 
institutional shock which stripped peasants off their property rights and reduced 
their incentives to work and invest.50  
 
Table 14. Decline in Farming Yields, 1955 versus 1957 
 
Year Wheat 
Kg/mu 
Soya 
Kg/mu 
Oilseed 
Kg/mu 
Sugar 
cane 
Kg/mu 
Beet 
Kg/mu 
Tobacco 
Kg/mu 
Large 
animals 
(104) 
1955 57.5 53.0 47.0 2647 926.5 79.0 8775 
1957 57.0 52.5 40.5 2599 628.0 48.0 8323 
Change –0.5 –0.5 –6.5 –48 –298.5 –31 –452 
Source: DNS 1998: 88. 
 
As Mao’s collectivisation triumphed, there was no visible improvement from 1957 
to 1977 (see Table 15). 
 
 
 
                                                 
become sinecurists as the ultimate reward for being Mao’s loyalists: officials without any 
qualification and usually completely incompetent (called tigan, literally ‘upgrading to the official 
rank’). On the other hand, intellectuals and professionals (managers, administrators, journalists, 
lawyers, doctors, teachers/professors, scientists, and technicians) were forced to leave their posts 
for years to endure hard labour in order to be de-intellectualized and de-professionalized (called 
laogai, literally ‘re-molding soul through hard labour’, and he gongnong dacheng yipian, meaning 
‘completely identified with manual workers and peasants’). Even the future intellectuals and 
professionals were not spared. School and university graduates were sent to countryside in the 
name of re-education in order to be de-intellectualized and de-professionalized, too (called zhishi 
qingnian shangshan xiaxiang, literally ‘sending students down to the countryside’). Meanwhile, 
law and order broke down nationwide and political violence (known as wudou, literally ‘armed 
fighting’), unlawful killings and imprisonment became rampant from 1966 to 1970 which led to 
nationwide marshal law (called junguan, literally ‘under army’s direct control’) with the aim to 
make China a militarized society (quanmin jiebing, meaning ‘everybody is made a soldier’). All 
these measures went hand in hand with a high degree of cronyism involving Mao’s wife Jian Qing 
and nephew Mao Yuanxin. To a great extent, therefore the Cultural Revolution was a ‘Great 
Cronyist Revitalisation’ to benefit Mao’s own friends and relatives. From economic development 
point of view, though, such policies of anti-specialisation (in terms of downgrading intellectuals 
and professionals) and anti-meritocracy (regarding cronyism and allowing manual workers to 
replace professionals) were utterly irrational.  
50 See Ling 1997; Zhang 1998. This resonates Stalin’s collectivisation. By 1933, Russia’s grain 
output dropped 30 percent; cattle, 44 percent; horses, 50 percent; pigs, 55 percent; and sheep and 
goats, 65 percent. A large-scale famine broke out. Four million died of starvation (Nove 1992: 165-
6). 
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Table 15. Agricultural Output Value, in Billion Yuan, 1957-77 
 
Year Current 
price 
Index (A) 1950 
price* 
Index (B) 
1957 53.7 100 48.1 100 
1977 80.7 150 28.7 60 
Nominal 
annual % 
 2.0  –2.6 
Net 
annual %¶ 
 –0.6  –5.2 
Source: China’s Statistic Year Book 1985: 239. 
Note: * Conversion is based on China’s average inflation rate of 2.01 percent per year from 1950 
to 1978 (Li 1997: 49-50). ¶ Net value is obtained by discounting China’s population growth at 2.6 
percent per year under Mao’s rule (He 1994: 7). 
 
So, in 1953, China’s total grain output was 177 million metric tons for a population 
of some 450 million, or 393.3 kilograms per head. In 1978, the total grain output 
reached 300 million tons for a population of 962.5 million, only 311.7 kilograms of 
grain per head. This was a drop of 21 percent in per capita terms.51 Here, once 
again, we call it ‘equilibrium’ because there was no possibility for the Maoist 
economy to break it free from inside of the system. 
 
 
V. People’s income and material life 
a. Forced savings to finance ISI  
1. State extraction through cross-sectoral arbitrage 
To run ISI, a country needs to finance growth internally. But internal financial 
constraint existed all the time. The Soviet solution, which can be traced back a 
temporary tactic of Lenin’s New Economic Policy in 1922-23, 52  was the 
aforementioned ‘scissors pricing tax’. The gap between the two sets of sectoral 
                                                 
51 Cui 1997: 10, 11, 15. 
52 See Gregory and Stuart 1994: 62-5. The original assumption of the Soviet planners was that the 
Russian peasantry would have the propensity to maintain their consumption pattern even if they 
had to pay higher prices for the same industrial goods and services. However, the Russian 
peasantry did not swallow the bait. The government procurement of grain remained at 50-57 
percent of the WWI level even after the grain output recovered; see Gregory and Stuart 1994: 65. 
An urban food shortage crisis soon re-occurred.  
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prices was the rent made by the state for capital accumulation. Under Stalin, such 
arbitrage and rent-seeking became a permanent measure from 1929 to 1953.53 
From the viewpoint of consumers in the economy, revenues from the scissors 
pricing tax can be viewed as forced savings imposed by the state. This policy was 
copied from the very beginning of Mao’s era and remained unchanged until its end 
(see Table 16).  
 
Table 16. China’s Price Indices, 1950-56 
 
Year Industrial 
goods 
Food stuff Rent % 
1950 100 100 0 
1952 110 90 20 
1954 123 78 45 
1956 125 77 48 
Source: National Price Commission 1964: 21. 
 
This government arbitrage also explains (1) why the agricultural sector produced 
only 28 percent of China’s total GDP with 71 percent of China’s total labour force,54 
and (2) why the non-agricultural sectors ‘generated’ 48.6 percent of China’s total 
GDP with 29 percent of China’s total labour force (see Tables 3 and 4). This 
scissors distortion made China’s agricultural GDP per capita 61 percent below the 
economy-wide unity ratio and its non-agricultural GDP per capita 88 percent 
above the ratio. In comparison, China’s Qing economy had a better balance. The 
agricultural sector provided 80 percent of China’s total employment and produced 
70 percent of China’s total GDP. 55  This means that the per capital GDP of 
agriculture was only 12.5 percent below the economy-wide unity ratio. Under Mao 
the sectoral per capital GDP gap was five times of the Qing. In other words, by the 
Qing standard, China’s agricultural sector would have produced at least 60 
                                                 
53 Gregory and Stuart 1994: 90. 
54 The rural population in 1978 was as high as 83 percent of China’s total; see Ling 1997: 102. 
55 Wang 1973: 80; Feuerwerker 1984: 299, 302, 312-13. 
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instead of 28 percent of the country’s total GDP. The rent was thus worth 32 
percent of China’s total GDP. 
 
It is known that Mao’s agricultural taxes were set at 10-12 percent of the total 
output, accounting for 2.8 to 3.4 percent of China’s total GDP.56 Now we know 
that this alleged low extraction rate was deceptive. The real extraction rate was 
about 10 times that of the stated amount. In this regard, Mao’s state was not only 
more efficient a rent-seeker than China’s imperial state but also more efficient 
than governments of Tsarist Russia, colonial India and Meiji Japan.57  
 
Quantitatively, the total sum extracted by Mao’s state from the agricultural sector 
from 1958 to 1978 was in the region of 990 billion yuan,58 almost twice of the 
aggregate investment of 500 billion yuan in industry during the same period. It is 
known also that the total asset of the agricultural sector (excluding land) was only 
15 billion yuan in 1978.59 So, the state squeezed annually 167 percent profit out 
of the value of the agricultural asset to finance the industrial sector’s growth. It is 
thus no exaggeration to state that Mao’s industrial sector free-rode on the back of 
China’s agriculture.  
 
But the consequence was a deteriorating agricultural sector and an impoverished 
peasantry. Till the end of the 1980s, the Chinese peasantry received incomes 45 
percent lower than it deserved.60 It is not difficult to understand the depression 
befallen upon the agricultural sector as the ‘rent-donner’ in the economy. To 
correct the distortion, the grain price increased five times during the 1990s.61 
                                                 
56 Cui 1997: 13; Chen 2001: 14. 
57  China’s old tax norm was around 10 percent of the total output (Deng 1999b: App. G; 
Feuerwerker 1984: 299-300). For rural taxes in Russia, India and Japan, see Gatrell 1986: 199, 
200; Francks, 1992: 30-1; Rothermund 1993: 83-4.  
58 Cui 1997: 13, 19; Lu 1999: 46. 
59 Guo 1998: 54. 
60 Chen and Han 1995: 14-15. 
61 Fan 1995: 39. 
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Meanwhile, easy capital and heavy protection did not make Mao’s industrial sector 
creative and innovative. Instead, they led to widespread conservatism. The acid 
test came in the 1990s in the process of ‘marketisation of prices’ for the industrial 
sector. Heavy slash on the artificially created nominal value of China’s state-
owned assets was inevitable. Overnight, a total of 500 billion yuan state-owned 
industrial assets evaporated.62 The party of the false economy was over. 
 
b. Wages in decline 
Forced savings came partly from wages under Mao’s rule. Nominal wages were 
frozen. With inflation, real wages eroded severely. By 1978, the real average wage 
in the industrial sector had been halved from its 1957 level (see Table 17).  
 
Table 17. Nominal and Real Annual Wages in the State Sector, in Yuan, 1957–78 
 
 Nominal Index Real (1957 
price)* 
Index 
1957 637 100 637 100 
1961 537 71 493 77 
1965 652 93 539 85 
1970 609 88 429 67 
1976 605 86 327 51 
1978 644 88 310 49 
Source: Based on V. D. Lippit, The Economic Development of China (Armonk, New York and New 
York: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), p. 150; cf. Zhao, “Path, Stages and Main Lessons.” 
Note: *Conversion is based on the average inflation rate of 2.01% per year for the period of 1950 
to 1978 (Li, ‘Macro Control’, pp. 49–50). 
 
The deteriorating real wage is positively confirmed by the declining supporting 
capacity per wage worker during the Mao’s period (see Table 18). As a result, the 
average size of the working class family shrunk by 35 percent. This basically 
means the urban working class was not better off.  
 
                                                 
62 See Zhang et al. 1996: 132, 142-3. At the moment, we put aside the thorny issue of official 
embezzlement which also affected asset value accounting. For early reports, see CCTV 2000; Chen 
2000. 
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Table 18. Decline in Dependent-Supporting Capacity per Wage Worker, 1957–77 
 
 Average size, 
persons 
No. of 
dependents/family 
Pre-1949 6.9 (100) 4.0 (100) 
1957 4.5 (65) 3.3 (83) 
1964 5.8 (84) 3.4 (85) 
1970 – 2.5 (63) 
1977 4.5 (65) 2.1 (53) 
Source: For pre-1949, see Cao, Demographic History, vol. 6, p. 516. For 1989 and 2000, see 
National Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Year Book, 2003, pp. 341, 345. Others, see Cui, “Urban-
rural Relationship and Urbanisation,” pp. 17–18. 
 
To compensate for the decline in real wages, Mao’s economic planners followed 
closely Stalin’s model of ‘total employment’: more and more workers were 
employed to share the same task but for a minimal wage.63 This policy created an 
enormous problem for the industrial sector known as the ‘unneeded labourers’ in 
the state-owned sector, accounting for 30 to 37 million of the total out of 100 
million employees of the sector.64 Rural China was no better. In the early 1980’s, 
unneeded labourers in the rural sector reached 300 million, or about a third of 
China’s rural population. 65  Unneeded labourers formed a heavy burden on 
China’s economic growth. They caused diminishing returns to set in and labour 
productivity to decline.  
 
c. High taxes, low wages and low consumption  
Meanwhile, to combat diminishing returns and declining labour productivity, the 
Maoist policy-makers opted for a super-high rate of capital formation for more 
annual capital investment to compensate losses in the labour efficiency.  
 
In a closed economy, this means first of all heavy taxation. Apart from the 
aforementioned scissors pricing tax and declining real wages, the government 
                                                 
63 Gregory and Stuart 1994: 273. 
64 As at the mid-1990s, see Gu 1998: 61; Niu 1998: 56. 
65 Xia and Zhu 1996: 48. 
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taxed the industrial sector heavily: the tax burden on the industrial sector was 
extremely high at an average rate of 86 percent (as at 1980).66 Nobody was able 
to avoid the tyranny of Maoist extraction which in turn sustained the super-high 
rate of capital formation for more annual investment (see Table 19). The loop is 
now complete.  
 
Table 19. High Investment and Low Consumption under Mao 
 
Year New 
investment 
GDP% 
Index 
I 
Consumption
GDP% 
Index 
II 
I:II 
1952 21.4 100 78.6 100 1.0 
1955 22.9 107 77.1 98 1.1 
1958 33.9 158 66.1 84 1.9 
1961 19.2 90 80.8 103 0.9 
1964 22.2 104 77.8 99 1.1 
1967 21.3 99 78.7 100 1.0 
1970 32.9 154 67.1 85 1.8 
1973 32.9 154 67.1 85 1.8 
1976 30.9 144 69.1 88 1.6 
Average 26.4 123 73.6 74 1.3 
Source: Based on Lippit 1987: 155. 
 
Without a doubt, high capital investment, low wages and low consumption formed 
different parts of the growth engine for the Maoist economy. It is no secret that (1) 
the Soviet type of planned economy never gave priority to an increase in wages 
nor did it to consumer goods and (2) the subsistence level of living was the only 
parameter for economic planners to gauge ordinary people’s material well-being. 
In other words, the Soviet planners had no desire or incentive to improve the 
material life of the masses. The ideal life for the ordinary Soviet citizens was 
Khrushchev’s infamous ‘goulash communism’ promised in a farming campaign in 
the late 1950s.67 In the entire Soviet history, therefore, a consumers’ revolution 
                                                 
66 Yang 1995: 44. 
67 Nove 1992: ch. 12. 
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did not occur. Did Mao’s economy perform any better than its Soviet counterpart? 
The answer is negative.  
 
As an example, food availability for ordinary citizens was kept artificially low in a 
famine diet during the whole of Mao’s era. To maintaining an adult at the 
subsistence level requires a minimum of 182.5 kilograms of husked grain a year 
(0.5 kilograms of grain a day). For un-husked or unprocessed amount, it becomes 
237 kilograms, as about 30 percent of the food weight will lose to the husking 
process. This is a famine diet. Anecdotally, compared with Khrushchev’s ‘a goulash 
per day’ and Kim’s ‘an apple per day’ (North Korea), Mao offered in the 1960s-70s 
‘liquid food for the slack season and solid for the busy one’. 
 
In 1978, Mao’s government procured a total of 141.7 million tons of foodstuff (47 
percent of the total output) from China’s rural sector. At that time, China’s 
agricultural residents were 683.4 million. Therefore, the state took away 207.3 
kilograms of grain from each rural resident. The retained food in the rural sector 
was 231. 7 kilograms of un-husked or unprocessed amount per head, 2.3 percent 
below the famine diet.  
 
On the urban front, the amount of 141.7 million tons of un-husked or unprocessed 
amount of foodstuff had to meet the needs of industrial material inputs as well as 
urban human consumption. The state set strict food ration of at 180 kilograms a 
year of husked grain a year for students and office workers, and 240 kilograms for 
heavy labourers. The state wanted to fix human food consumption so that more 
grain was made available for industrial production. In addition, it is the state 
policy that human calorie intake depended chiefly on grain, meat being regarded 
as a luxury because it takes land to produce meet.68 The famine diet definitely 
applied to urban China, too. 
                                                 
68 Mao’s food rationing applied to people from cradle to grave. In 1978, each urban adult was 
granted basic food items and quantities for each calendar month; see Ling 1997: 101. As the threat 
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The ultimate reason for low food availability in Mao’s China was a lack of 
production incentives from the peasantry, which is shown from China’s food 
deficits (see Table 9). In 1961-78, China’s net food shortage totaled 59.8 million 
tons, or 3.5 million tons a year.69 Not until 1984 (when China’s total grain output 
reached 400 million tons) did China’s per capita grain output bounce back to its 
1953 level, at 380 kilograms per head.70 Soon, China’s decades’ long food rationing 
was finally lifted.71  
 
The term ‘low level equilibrium’ is valid regarding workers’ wages and ordinary 
people’s consumption. Also there was no possibility for the Maoist economy to 
break it free from inside of the system. 
 
d. Prolonged poverty 
It was taboo to talk about poverty during Mao’s era even though the phenomenon 
was visible and nation-wide. In terms of ‘relative poverty’, the period between 1957 
and 1978 was marred by deteriorating standards of living among the majority of 
the population. In rural China, by 1978, two-thirds of the rural population became 
poorer than 20 years before; and the remaining one-third poorer than 40 years 
earlier.72 Indeed, the entire peasantry became seriously worse off under Mao. 
Nation-wide, things were not much better: meat and cooking oil consumption 
declined by about a third; urban housing, 20 percent; retail shops, 70 percent.73 
In terms of ‘absolute poverty’, by 1978, half of China’s population had lived on or 
below the official poverty line.74 Table 20 shows the breakdown.  
                                                 
of hanger was constant, the life expectancies in Mao’s China had to be low regardless of what the 
official propaganda has claimed.  
69 Lu 1999: 46. 
70 Wang 1996: 45. 
71 It was not until the mid-1980s that the rationed grain consumption in urban China finally 
reached 250 kilograms of husked grain and 25 kilograms of meat per head per year; see Chen and 
Han 1995: 10. 
72 Ling 1997: 102-3. 
73 Zhao 2000: 100. 
74  Chen Zongsheng, Shouru Chabie Pinkun Ji Shiye (Income Differentiation, Poverty and 
Unemployment (Tianjin: Nankai University Press, 2000), pp. 132–3. 
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Table 20. China’s Population below the Official Poverty Line, % in Total 
 
Scope 1978 1988 
Urban 10.7 (100) 8.3 (78) 
Rural 65.1 (100) 15.7 (24) 
National 49.3 (100) 15.9 (32) 
Source: Chen 2000: 132-3. 
 
It is thus not surprising that the majority in Mao’s China had a hand-to-mouth 
existence. In the 1960s to the 70s, China’s overall Engel’s coefficient was as high 
as 0.7.75 In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping’s reforms began, China’s overall Engel’s 
coefficient was 0.72.76  
 
But ultimately, poverty was caused by excessive extraction of the Maoist state. As 
shown in Table 21, the state sector possessed too much while the general public 
owned too little, which is highly compatible with the data in Table 26. The 
situation began reversing only after 1978. 
 
Table 21. Distribution of GDP, Late Qing, 1978 and 1995 
 
 Government SOEs State 
total 
Citizens 
Late Qing   24.0 76.0 
1978 33.5 16.1 49.6 50.4 
1995 13.2 18.3 31.5 68.5 
Sources: Stover and Stover 1976: 10; He 1997: 62. 
Note: SOEs - State-owned enterprises. 
 
e. Equity and equality 
In terms of poverty alleviation and elimination, Mao’s regime did not score well at 
all. But what about equality? After all, Mao’s China was portrayed itself to the 
outside world as a country of egalitarianism without private ownership and 
market profiteering.  
                                                 
75 He 1994: 8. 
76 Cui 1997: 12. 
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The term ‘equality’ can be interpreted in many ways. But in essence, it is a 
normative concept which means that citizens are or should be treated equally or 
fairly with basic dignity. Thus, it is closely related to people’s rights which in turn 
give people bargaining power. There can also be a vision of positivism: equality 
can mean that everyone is treated equally badly as in the case of subjects under a 
tyrant. It is thus important to use the term ‘equity and equality’ to avoid any 
misconception of the agenda.  
 
It is commonly agreed that under collectivisation Chinese farmers were stripped 
of their (1) landholding rights, (2) production decision-making rights, (3) 
marketing rights, (4) travelling and migration rights. What to produce, how to 
produce, when to produce and for whom to produce were all decided by the party-
state. Such a system created personal bondage of producers to the party-state.77 
This resembles the Tsarist state serfdom or rather than personal freedom-cum-
Marxian communism.  
 
Without their rights and bargaining power, China’s rural population, about 70 to 
80 percent of China’s total, did not have access to the state provision of education, 
health care and pensions. This was not trivial in terms of what the rural 
population was able to get back from the hundreds of billion yuan they paid in 
taxes (including scissors pricing). The increased inequality can be shown in Gini 
coefficient (Table 22). 
 
Table 22. Trend of Gini Coefficient, 1952-83 
 
 Gini coefficient Index 
1952 (early Maoism) 0.25 100 
1978 (late Maoism) 0.31 124 
Source: Zhang 1994: 41. 
 
                                                 
77 Cui 1997: 11-12. 
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All the evidence suggests a ‘zero-sum’ gamed between the state and individual 
citizens, and between the privileged urban sector and the disadvantaged rural 
sector. Such a zero-sum determined poverty and inequality under Mao’s rule. 
 
 
VI. Model for China’s low level equilibrium trap 
In the Maoist economy, the state allocated most resources including land, capital, 
technology and labour and creamed all the surpluses above subsistence wages. 
Thus, there was a ‘zero-sum’ game between the state profit and ordinary people’s 
incomes.  
 
Now, to capture such an economic system in which ordinary people’s living 
standards are dictated by returns for the state ownership of land, capital and 
technology in a straightforward bilateral relationship, we opt for a ‘representative-
agent model’ which has two key factors: (1) g = ‘planned capital investment by the 
state’ and (2) c = ‘planned private consumption’.  
 
From well documented policy and practice, the Maoist state purposely maximised 
g at the expense of c to the point that people’s consumption was kept to a biological 
minimum (i.e. a ‘famine diet’ approach). We therefore define the ceiling of private 
consumption as 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚. The Maoist private consumption level satisfies the following 
condition: c ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚. The factor correspondent to c is ‘state spending’ g, as a proxy 
for state capital investment in the economy. 
 
We define the utility function for the representative agent as u (c, g).78 To suppose 
the representative agent derives positive but diminishing marginal utility from 
planned private consumption, therefore 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 > 0, 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 < 0. 𝑢𝑢𝑔𝑔 > 0, 𝑢𝑢𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 < 0.  
                                                 
78 The model developed in this section is the simplified version of the one by Gong and Zou 2002. 
This approach is also in line with the spirit of Arrow and Kurz 1970; Barro 1990; Turnosvsky 1995; 
Turnovsky and Fisher 1995; and Devrajan, Swaroop and Zou 1996.   
38 
 
We adopt the stochastic technology approach to model the growth of output,79 and 
define the output flow over the period (t, t + dt) as follows: 
 
dY = f (k) dt + h (k) dy, 𝑓𝑓′(𝑘𝑘) >0, 𝑓𝑓′′(k) ≤0                  (1) 
 
Where a determinant f (k) is the mean rate of output per unit of time; h (k) is a 
stochastic component to reflect various random influences on production;80 dy 
represents a stochastic shock which is temporally independent from a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑: 
 
E (dy) = 0, Var (dy) = 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  
 
The return of government spending in heavy industry can be captured in a 
stochastic process:81 
 
dg = g (t) dt + m (k) dz                                     (2) 
 
Where dz is an intertemporally independent and normally distributed random 
variable with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝜎𝑧𝑧2dt. 
 
There are two types of capital assets in our model: k for heavy industry, and b for 
agriculture. The returns to k and b are 𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘 and 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏, respectively, written as follows:  
 
d𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘  = 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘  
d𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏  =  𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  
                                                 
79 This approach was adopted by Eaton and Gersovitz 1981; Gertler and Grinols 1982; Grinols and 
Turnovsky 1998; and Turnovsky 1993, 1995.  
80 Same as Gong and Zou 2002.  
81 As the same as the approach of Gong and Zou 2002, we extend the model specifications in Bertola 
and Drazen 1991; Turnovsky 1995. 
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Where 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 represents the mean return to capital; 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘 is the stochastic term with 
mean 0; and 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏  is the deterministic return to agriculture. The reason for a 
deterministic return to agriculture is due to the state scissors-pricing policies to 
extract surpluses from the agricultural sector to finance a growth in industry in 
general and a growth in heavy industry in particular.  
 
We further denote τdY as government expenditure earmarked for industry. Such 
expenditure comes from all revenues extracted from (1) the agricultural sector and 
(2) the daily consumption of the general public, both urban and rural 
 
dg = τdY + db − bd𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏  
 
Moreover, the budget constraint for the Maoist state can be expressed as follows: 
 
dw = [(1− τ) 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 +  𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘) 𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐]𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤              (3) 
 
Where w = k + b shows the total wealth of the state; 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 and 𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏 are the holding 
shares of capital goods and consumer goods:  
 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘  =  𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤, 𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏  =  𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤                                           (4) 
 
Here, dv is a stochastic process which can be defined as:  
 
dv = (1− τ) 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘                                          (5) 
 
The state imposes a planned private consumption path, c (t), as well as asset 
holding shares 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 and 𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏 to maximize its discounted utility as follows: 
 
Max𝐸𝐸0 ∫ 𝑢𝑢 (𝑐𝑐,𝑔𝑔) 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑∞0  
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All this is subject to the budget constraint (15) and the portfolio constraint:  
 �dw =  [(1 − τ) 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 +  𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘) 𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐]𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤      𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘  +  𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏  =  1𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚                
 
To obtain analytical solutions to planned private consumption and asset holdings, 
we specify the production function, the return to government spending on heavy 
industry, and the utility function as follows:82  
 
 dY = Ak (dt + dy)                                           (6) 
 dg = 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔                                        (7) 
 u (c, g) = 
𝑐𝑐1−𝛾𝛾1−𝛾𝛾 𝑔𝑔−𝜆𝜆                                           (8) 
 
Where A, 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔 and 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 are constants; 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔 is the mean rate of the return to state 
investment in heavy industry; and 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔  is the volatility in the same return. 
Components 𝜆𝜆 and 𝛾𝛾 satisfy the following conditions: γ > 1 and 𝜆𝜆 > 0. Here, 𝛾𝛾 
is the inverse value of intertemporal substitution in planned private consumption 
and it is greater than one because the state set people’s consumption level ex ante 
to make sure little was left for private savings or demand for extra consumer goods 
above the subsistence. In addition, as inputs in consumer goods production are 
fixed, all the available resources go straight to the heavy industrial sector. 
 
To substitute the Budget Constraint (3) with Equation (6), we rewrite the budget 
constraint as the following:  
 
                                                 
82 The same as the approach adopted by Gong and Zou 2002. 
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𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤  =  �(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘  +  𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘) − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤� 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤                        
 
To solve it, we introduce a value function V (w, g, t), and define V (w, g, t) = X (w, 
g) 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 and a differential operator: 
 
L (X (w, g, t) 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌)  =  {−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 +  𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤[(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 +  𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘)𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐]  + 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 +
 
12𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘2𝑤𝑤2𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2  +  12𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔2  +  12𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌  
 
The problem here is tantamount to the maximisation of the following Lagrangian 
expression with respect to c (t) and 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘: 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑐𝑐(𝜌𝜌),𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 {𝑢𝑢 (𝑐𝑐,𝑔𝑔) − 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 + 𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤[(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 +  𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘)𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐]  + 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 +12𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘2𝑤𝑤2𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2  +  12𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔2  +  12𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔�   
 
The first conditions are:  
 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐,𝑔𝑔)  =  𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤                                                   (9) 𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤[(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤] + 𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤2𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2  +  12𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔 𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔 = 0              (10) 
 
Based on Equations (9) and (10) and with the optimal values of c (t) and 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘, the 
value function must satisfy the following Bellman Equation:  
 
u (c, g) − ρX +  𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤[(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 +  𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘)𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐]  +  𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 12𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘2𝑤𝑤2𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2  +
 
12𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔2  + 12𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔  =  0                                      (11) 
 
From Utility Function (8), we define the value function as the following:  
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X (w, g) = δ𝑤𝑤1−𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔−𝜆𝜆 
 
Where the coefficient δ can be determined by a partial differentiation of the value 
function, and hence:  
 𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤  =  (1 − 𝛾𝛾) δ𝑤𝑤−𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔−𝜆𝜆   𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔  =  −𝜆𝜆δ𝑤𝑤1−𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔−𝜆𝜆−1  𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔  =  (1 − 𝛾𝛾) (−𝜆𝜆) δ𝑤𝑤−𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔−𝜆𝜆−1  𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤  =  (1 − 𝛾𝛾) (−𝛾𝛾) δ𝑤𝑤−𝛾𝛾−1𝑔𝑔−𝜆𝜆  𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  =  𝜆𝜆 (𝜆𝜆 +  1) δ𝑤𝑤1−𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔−𝜆𝜆−2  
 
Substitute the first-order condition shown in Equations (8) and (11) with the above 
expressions, we have 
                                                     𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤  =  [𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛾𝛾)]−1𝛾𝛾                                               (12) 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘  =  [(1−𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴−𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏]−12𝜆𝜆𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝛾𝛾𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2                                            (13) 
 
And, 
 
[𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛾𝛾)]−1𝛾𝛾 − 𝜌𝜌 +  (1 − 𝛾𝛾) �(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘  +  𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘) − [𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛾𝛾)]−1𝛾𝛾� − λ𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔 − 12 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘2𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2  +  12 𝜆𝜆(𝜆𝜆 +  1)𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔2 − 12 λ(1 − γ)𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔  =  0.              (14) 
 
Therefore, 
 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤  =  [𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛾𝛾)]−1𝛾𝛾  =  𝜌𝜌−(1−𝛾𝛾)[(1−𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 + 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏(1−𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘)] + λ𝜇𝜇𝑦𝑦𝛾𝛾  + 12𝛾𝛾(1−𝛾𝛾)𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘2𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2 + 12𝜆𝜆(𝜆𝜆 + 1)𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2𝛾𝛾  + 
 
12λ(1−γ)𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝛾𝛾                                                     (15) 
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From Equations (4) and (2), we derive explicit stochastic differential equation for 
(15) which captures ordinary people’s wealth during the Maoist period. We then 
factor in expectations in Equation (11) to obtain the expected growth rate of 
private consumption and state-run capital accumulation and investment: 
 ϕ =  E 𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤  =  {[(1 − 𝜏𝜏)]𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 + 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘) − [𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛾𝛾)]−1𝛾𝛾}             (16) 
 
From Equation (16) we work out comparative statics to see how the growth rate of 
the economy (people’s wealth) is linked to the mean rate of return to state spending 
on heavy industry. We differentiate ϕ regarding to 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔 and obtain the following:  
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦  =  −𝜆𝜆𝛾𝛾    
 
Under Mao’s rule, γ > 1, we thus conclude that 
 
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦  =  −𝜆𝜆𝛾𝛾 < 0                                                  (17) 
 
Equation (17) leads to the following proposition in this paper: 
Proposition 1: Under Mao’s rule, a rise in government investment led to a decline 
in people’s wealth due to a lower value of intertemporal substitution in consumption 
which was pre-determined by the state prevention of above subsistence spending in 
society and by the interlinking famine diet imposed on ordinary citizens.  
 
 
VII. Final remarks 
We have established a new way to capture the nature and performance of China’s 
economy under Mao’s rule: a low level equilibrium trap. First of all, throughout 
Mao’s era, China had problematic growth and problematic development: the 
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growth was unbalanced and unsustainable. China seemed to start with an 
equilibrium by 1954 and ended up with a severe disequilibrium in 1978. This was 
largely due to a lack of understanding of modernisation and a lack of imagination 
(under a lazy leadership everything being copied from Stalin). Mao’s Great Leap 
Forward was not the end of the beginning of fast growth. Rather, it was the 
beginning of the end of a state resource allocation and a low level equilibrium trap. 
Economic Maoism was proved unsuited to China, a country that had a very long 
history of a market economy and market allocation of resources. Thus, despite the 
alleged surge in economic growth, Mao’s China remained largely rural. A 
structural change in the economy was but negligible. This becomes most obvious 
when the real growth stances are revealed.  
 
Secondly, the industrial sector became parasitic on the agricultural sector. Much 
of the nominal gain in industrial GDP was to a great extent as a result of the 
deliberative price distortion and should thus be severely discounted. Meanwhile, 
the nominal share of the agricultural GDP needs to be multiplied. This distortion 
led to perpetual poor performance in both the farming sector which was not 
awarded and the industrial sector whose capital windfall had little to do with its 
own improvement.  
 
Thirdly, Mao’s economy was not designed to enrich and empower the masses in 
society and the latter in turn responded to his policy with apathy and low morale. 
This created economy-wide disincentives to work. 
 
All these findings fundamentally challenge the notion that Mao’s period was a 
period of great economic growth and development.83 Now, judging by China’s 
general track record, growth/developmental strategy, economic structure, 
economic performance and people’s living standards, Mao only achieved a low level 
                                                 
83 There are numerous works with romantic pro-Mao views, see for example Riskin 1987.  
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equilibrium with excessive state rent-seeking and economic mismanagement. In 
short, the Maoist state was a liability, not an asset, for China’s growth and 
development.  
 
It was not until 1978 that a developmental state was revitalized in Mainland 
China when Deng Xiaoping launched his reforms with a clearly stated goal for the 
first time since 1949 of improving ordinary people’s living standards (xiaokang, 
literally meaning ‘modest prosperity’). This marked the beginning for China to 
move toward an ideal combination of ‘strong state and rich population’.  
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Appendix: Growth statistics and estimates, 1949-66 
 
Table i shows China’s nominal growth; and Table ii, China’s real and net growth. 
The gap between the two sets is obvious. 
 
Table i. China’s Nominal GDP Growth, 1949-66, in Billion Yuan 
 
Year Total GDP Index 
1949 35.8 100 
1950 42.6 119 
1951 49.7 139 
1952 58.9 165 
1953 70.9 198 
1954 74.8 209 
1955 78.8 220 
1956 88.2 246 
1957 90.8 253 
1958 111.8 312 
1959 122.2 341 
1960 122.0 341 
1961 99.6 278 
1962 92.4 258 
1963 100.0 279 
1964 116.6 327 
1965 138.7 387 
1966 158.6 443 
Annual %  9.2 
Sources: Based on China’s Statistic Year Book 1983: 13-14, 22-3; ZJB 1999: 24, 40, 51, 64-5, 76-7, 
99-100, 108-9, 128, 141, 155, 168-9, 181-2, 189-90, 197-8, 206, 261. 
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Table ii. China’s Real and Net GDP Growth, 1949-66, in Billion Yuan 
 
Year Real GDP Index Net GDP Index 
1949 35.8 100 35.8 100 
1950 41.7 116 40.6 113 
1951 47.7 133 46.5 130 
1952 55.3 154 53.9 150 
1953 65.0 182 63.3 177 
1954 67.0 187 65.2 182 
1955 68.8 192 67.0 187 
1956 75.0 210 73.0 204 
1957 75.1 210 73.1 204 
1958 89.9 251 87.6 246 
1959 95.3 266 92.8 259 
1960 92.1 257 89.7 250 
1961 72.7 203 70.8 198 
1962 65.1 182 63.4 177 
1963 67.9 190 66.1 185 
1964 76.0 212 74.0 207 
1965 86.7 242 84.4 236 
1966 94.8 265 92.3 258 
Annual %  5.9  5.7 
Source: The same as Table i. 
Note: Real growth rate is obtained by a discount of the average inflation rate of 2.01 percent a year 
from 1950 to 1978 (Li 1997: 49-50). Net growth rate discounts the real growth rate further with a 
rate of 2.6 percent of annual population growth during 1950-80 (He 1994: 7). 
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